Many modern science organizations aim to emulate the blend of "applied" and "basic" research that fueled the success of institutions like Bell Labs. The key question is: how did Bell Labs consistently identify research avenues that were both intellectually stimulating and commercially viable?
This piece explores Bell Labs' strategies for ensuring its researchers focused on the right problems. It's the first in a series examining lessons from industrial R&D giants like Bell Labs, GE Research Laboratory, and DuPont, revealing "common sense" management decisions that are often overlooked today.
Bell Labs is often portrayed as a haven for unfettered curiosity. While it fostered basic research, its approach was more structured than many realize. Frank Jewett, Bell Labs' founding Director, envisioned it as:
An instrument capable of avoiding many of the mistakes of a blind cut-and-try experimentation... [bringing] to bear an aggregate of creative force on any particular problem.
John Pierce, a long-time researcher and manager, emphasized that Bell Labs' success stemmed from the fact that:
Someone depended on them for something, and was anxious to get it.
Jim Fisk, another key figure, highlighted the balancing act:
Our fundamental belief is that there is no difference between good science and good science relevant to our business... What we try to provide is the atmosphere that will make selecting the one or two in a thousand a matter of individual responsibility and essentially automatic.
In essence, Bell Labs aimed to empower researchers to explore interesting problems, while ensuring those problems had a high probability of yielding profitable solutions for the Bell Telephone system.
Bell Labs employed three key strategies to guide its researchers:
Bell Labs didn't dictate research topics. Instead, it emphasized the importance of relevance to the Bell system. John Pierce's early experience illustrates this:
I was told to do research on vacuum tubes... I was just supposed to plan something to do and do it. I think that is close to cruel and unusual punishment... Too much freedom is horrible... It’s my guess that for every person who needs more freedom, there are ten people who need more help in finding their way.
Pierce discovered ongoing development work through osmosis and tailored his research accordingly. Morry Tannenbaum called this "circumscribed freedom."
Regular interaction with those who would eventually use the research was crucial. Researchers were expected to assist applied teams, leading to new research ideas. Pierce noted:
You got to talk to people who were engaged in the operation of things, who were engaged in the manufacture of things, and you got a picture of the rest of the world which certainly influenced what research you did... The idea of a research institute without ties to either teaching or to manufacturing or operational organization seems a terribly sterile idea.
Systems engineers (10% of Bell Labs' headcount) played a vital role, keeping:
One eye on the reservoir of new knowledge and another on the existing phone system and analyzed how to integrate the two.
Mervin Kelly described them as having:
A proper blending of competence and background in each of the three areas that it contacts: research and fundamental development, specific systems and facilities development, and operations... [exhibiting] unusual talents in analysis and the objectivity so essential to their appraisal responsibility.
They identified opportunities by understanding manufacturing processes, material degradation, repair costs, and technical bottlenecks. One executive noted that a plastic cable sheathing developed by Bell chemists, prompted by a systems engineer, saved Bell "more than the total research budget of Bell Labs for the decade."
Kelly emphasized the importance of connecting manufacture and basic research, terming it "organized creative technology."
The development of the mobile phone system exemplifies the power of systems engineering. In 1966, rumors of the FCC allocating more radio spectrum spurred Bell engineers Dick Frenkiel and Phil Porter to action.
They built upon Doug Ring and Rae Young's 1947 proposal for a hexagonal cell system, enabling efficient spectrum use. Frenkiel and Porter tackled key questions:
Joel Engel joined the project, and the trio leveraged fieldwork, conceptual understanding, and knowledge of engineering developments to create a viable system. As Engel noted:
We were not visionaries... We were techies. If there was a vision it was primarily as a business service. Real estate agents. Doctors who made house calls.
While the project didn't yield Nobel-level breakthroughs, it required countless engineering innovations. Engineers like Bill Jakes and Gerry DiPiazza studied signal behavior in various terrains. Thanks to the systems engineers, this effort was focused on the right sub-problems.
Bell Labs' approach highlights that great systems engineering can be as crucial as great research minds. Other successful applied science orgs, like GE Research and DuPont, also employed similar roles under different names.
New science organizations should seriously consider integrating systems engineers. While the ratio may vary, zero is likely the wrong number. Even with a large pool of talent, Bell Labs didn't rely on chance for problem identification.
Great problem selection is too important to be left to chance.